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CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS: GOVERNANCE CHANGE 
THROUGH GLOBALIZATION? 
 
Li-Wen Lin* 
 
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state 
capitalism in which important capitalist enterprises have a close 
relationship with the state.  One prominent feature of China’s state 
capitalism is the fundamental role of about 100 large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) controlled by organs of the central government in 
critical industries such as oil, telecom, and transportation.  These SOEs are 
often dubbed “China’s national champions.”  They are not only important 
players in China’s domestic economy but also major contributors to 
China’s fast-growing global investment.  Their global expansion however 
often encounters political and regulatory challenges abroad, partly because 
their corporate governance practices are opaque and often deviant from 
international standards.  Prevailing theories suggest that political and 
regulatory pressure arising from institutional distance between China and 
host countries (particularly advanced economies such as the United States) 
may act as an effective force to push for SOE governance change.  
Empirical findings in this Article however indicate that the development of 
global equity connections that potentially expose SOEs to foreign 
institutional pressure seems virtually irrelevant to the reform patterns of 
these most important non-financial SOEs in China.  The absence of 
correlation may be related to investment structure and geography, 
investment motives, and importantly, China’s domestic political institutions.  
This Article offers insights into the perennial scholarly debate about the 
future of national corporate governance systems in the era of globalization 
and also provides practical recommendations for Chinese and international 
policymakers
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law. . JSD, 
PhD (sociology).  I am grateful for financial support by Columbia University and the TMX 
Group (the holding company of the Toronto Stock Exchange). I appreciate comments on the 
previous draft by Josh Whitford, David Stark, Dan Wang and Curtis Milhaupt. 
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I. Introduction 
The downfall of Eastern European socialism and the softening of 
Chinese communism in the 1980s appeared to conclusively declare a 
victory of free market capitalism.  The victory however turns out to be rather 
uncertain as the twenty-first century unfolds.  The financial crisis in 2008 
unabashedly disgraced liberal capitalism.  The U.S. economy, the champion 
of free market, even resorted to government ownership for relief.  
Meanwhile, as noted in the Economist, “[t]he crisis of Western liberal 
capitalism has coincided with the rise of a powerful new form of [state] 
capitalism in emerging markets,”1 frequently described as state capitalism.  
It is now often, albeit subject to debate, characterized as “a system in which 
governments use state-owned companies and investment vehicles to 
dominate market activity.”2     
China is regarded as the world’s leading practitioner of state 
capitalism.  One prominent feature of China’s state capitalism is the 
fundamental role of about 100 large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under 
the central government’s control in “critical industries such as oil, steel, 
telecom, and transportation.” 3   These SOEs are often dubbed “China’s 
national champions.”  Many of them, including China National Petroleum 
Corporation and China Mobile Communications Corporation, are Fortune 
Global 500 companies (the world’s largest 500 companies by revenues).4  
                                                 
1  Adrian Woolridge, The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931. 
2 Ian Bremmer & Devin T. Stewart, China’s State Capitalism Poses Ethical Challenges, 
ASIA TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/ 
LH17Cb01.html.  
3 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 725 (2013). 
4  Id. 
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These SOEs are not only prominent companies in China’s domestic 
economy, but also active players in the field of global investment.  At 
present, China is the third largest country, behind the United States and 
Japan, with respect to outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flow. 5  
Notably, a massive portion of China’s outward FDI is contributed by the 
national champions.6  
  In recent years, Chinese SOEs’ global expansion has aroused great 
controversies in host countries.  State ownership often raises the specter of 
undue government influence in SOE management, which may pose threats 
to the host country’s national interests.  This concern is exacerbated by the 
fact that Chinese SOEs have low transparency and their actual corporate 
governance practices usually deviate from international standards.  In 
response, some host countries including Australia, Canada and the United 
States have welcomed Chinese SOEs with great caution through (usually 
politicized) regulatory reviews. 7   Often, the regulators scrutinize the 
acquiring SOE’s corporate governance quality and sometimes may 
condition their approval by requiring the SOE to adopt certain governance 
practices.8  
As China’s national champions continue to globalize, it raises 
important questions about how their governance would change in the face 
of mounting political and regulatory pressure in host countries.  Specifically 
speaking, can exposure to international environments serve as an effective 
mechanism for Chinese national champions to learn and converge on 
prevailing international corporate governance practices?  Do foreign 
investment regulatory regimes in the United States and other countries play 
any significant role in modernizing governance practices of Chinese SOEs?  
Does Chinese SOEs’ global expansion through subsidiaries or other 
channels diffuse any positive effects back to their parent companies 
headquartered in Beijing?  
The pursuit of these questions will shed some light on the perennial 
scholarly debate about the trajectory of national corporate governance 
systems in the age of globalization.  It will also make an interdisciplinary 
contribution.  Researchers of international business typically focus on how 
                                                 
5 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2014 – Investing 
in the SDGs: An Action Plan, 7, UNCTAD/WIR/2014, (June 24, 2014), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf [hereinafter World Investment 
Report 2014].  
6  See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, REPORT ON CHINA’S 
OUTWARD INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION 2011-2012, at 117 (reporting that 
70.5% of China’s FDI flow was contributed by the SOEs controlled by the central 
government; also see Section II for more detailed information discussing the role of China’s 
National Champions). 
7 See Section III (analyzing the regulatory challenges abroad). 
8 See infra Table 2 (discussing major countries that have a regulatory system of foreign 
investment). 
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corporate governance structures including ownership structure, 9  board 
composition, 10  top management team, 11  and executive compensation 12 
influence a firm’s internationalization strategies.  Little attention has been 
paid to the flipside of this research inquiry, namely how the investing firm 
located in the home country may change its governance practices as a result 
of internationalization. 13   This Article attempts to fill this void by 
investigating Chinese national champions’ government reform pattern in 
the course of globalization. Beyond scholarly contributions, this Article has 
practical policy implications.  It provides a better understanding of whether 
and how to utilize globalization to improve the SOE reform in China.  
Moreover, it provides better knowledge for international investors and 
regulators as to how to implement foreign investment regulations to develop 
mutually beneficial relationships with China’s SOEs.  
This Article draws on network and institutional theories in 
sociology, the approaches commonly adopted in relevant international 
business studies, to hypothesize the relationship between international 
investment and governance reform patterns of the 100 or so non-financial 
SOEs under the Chinese central government’s control.  It predicts that 
outward investment will create inward influence on SOE governance, 
especially when the SOE invests in a foreign regime that has much higher 
corporate governance standards than its home regime, and the degree of 
influence is mediated through different investment structures.  This 
theoretical thinking however seems to have limited explanatory power for 
Chinese national champions.  The empirical findings in this Article indicate 
that international exposure to strong corporate governance regimes and 
investment regulatory systems hostile to foreign SOEs (e.g. Australia, 
Canada and the United States) appears virtually irrelevant to the reform 
patterns of these most important non-financial SOEs in China.  This Article 
offers a number of possible explanations for the absence of correlation 
                                                 
9 Gabriel R. G. Benito et al., Distant Encounters of the Third Kind: Multinational Companies 
Locating Divisional Headquarters Abroad, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 373, 373 (2011); Sumon 
Kumar Bhaumik et al., Does Ownership Structure of Emerging-Market Firms Affect Their 
Outward FDI? The Case of the Indian Automotive and Pharmaceutical Sectors, 41 J. INT’L 
BUS. STUD. 437, 437 (2009).  
10  Igor Filatotchev & Mike Wright, Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of 
Multinational, Enterprises, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 471, 471 (2011); Yung-Chih Lien et al., The 
Role of Corporate Governance in FDI Decisions: Evidence from Taiwan, 14 INT’L BUS. REV. 
739, 739 (2005).   
11 Laszlo Tihanyi et al, Composition of the Top Management Team and Firm International 
Diversification, 26 J. MGMT. 1157, 1157 (2000).  
12 WM. Gerard Sanders & Mason A. Carpenter, Internationalization and Firm Governance: 
The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team Composition, and Board Structure, 41 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 158, 158 (1998).  
13 See Nai H. Wu & Laszlo Tihanyi, Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and 
Internationalization, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Mar. 2013, at 449-
464 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013) (noting that extant research on multinational firms 
unfortunately has limited integration with corporate governance). 
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between internationalization and governance reform.  Among other reasons, 
investment structures and investment geography pose obstacles to 
transmitting positive governance effects back to the (ultimate) parent SOEs.  
Moreover, SOE governance reform is a result more of the Chinese 
government’s central planning than market behavior decided at the firm 
level.  The popular hypothesis that internationalization leads to governance 
reform is founded on market-driven logic, and it does not apply well to the 
SOEs that are deeply embedded in the state system.  
This Article is organized as follows.  Section II provides an 
overview of the organizational structure of China’s national champions and 
their magnitude in China’s globalization scheme.  Their organizational 
structure forms a corporate network through which influence may possibly 
be transmitted. In Section III, this Article reviews foreign investment 
regulations in some major countries and recent controversial investments 
involving Chinese SOEs.  The review identifies which regulatory 
jurisdictions may pose institutional pressure on Chinese SOEs in their 
course of globalization.  Section IV hypothesizes how globalization through 
international investment may influence an investing SOE’s governance 
practices based on the popular assumption that firms are responsive to 
international market and institutional disparity pressure.  Section V offers 
preliminary empirical evidence concerning the 113 non-financial SOEs 
under the Chinese central government’s control as of the end of 2013.  
Section VI discusses scholarly and policy implications.  Section VII finally 
concludes with questions for future research.          
 
II. Globalizing China’s National Champions 
 
China is not only a major recipient of FDI but also has become a 
significant FDI source.  China’s outward FDI flow (excluding Hong Kong) 
increased from $2.3 billion in 2000 to $101 billion in 2013, ranking as the 
country with the third largest outward FDI flow in the world, behind the 
United States and Japan.14   This astonishing growth in outward FDI is 
mainly contributed by the government’s “going global” policy, formally 
launched in 2000, which encourages Chinese firms to invest aboard.  Under 
this policy, the Chinese government provides financial and diplomatic 
resources, particularly for SOEs to go on a shopping spree acquiring 
prominent companies and valuable assets worldwide.15 
                                                 
14 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting 
Linkages, 298, UNCTAD/WIF/2001, (Sept. 17, 2001), 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2001_en.pdf; World Investment Report 2014, supra note 5, at 
205. 
15 It has been estimated that 95-97% of the outward foreign investment lending provided by 
the policy banks in China went to the SOEs. See Amos Irwin & Keven P. Gallagher, 
Exporting National Champions: China’s OFDI Finance in Comparative Perspective (B.U. 
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As of 2013, wholly government-owned SOEs accounted for 55.2% 
of China’s non-financial outward investment stock.16  It has been estimated 
that SOEs of all kinds, including wholly- and partially-state controlled, 
contributed approximately 85-90% of China’s outward FDI. 17   A vast 
majority of China’s top 100 companies by outward FDI stock and flow are 
SOEs wholly owned by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration (SASAC), the central government’s ownership agency.  
Table 1 below shows a list of the top twenty non-financial Chinese firms by 
outward investment stock as of 2012.  All the top twenty contributors are 
SOEs owned by SASAC.18 
 
Table 1: Top 20 Non-Financial Chinese Enterprises by Outward Investment 
Stock, 2012
19 
 
Rank Name of Enterprise Industry Ownership 
1 China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec) 
Petroleum SOE under 
SASAC 
2 China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) 
Petroleum SOE under 
SASAC 
                                                 
Global Econ. Governance Initiative, Working Paper No. 6, 2014) (discussing the financial 
role of the state in relation to China’s outward foreign direct investment).  
16 2013 Niandu Zhongguo Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Tongji Gongbao (2013年度中国฀外直接
投฀฀฀公报) [2013 Statistical Bulletin Of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics, and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of People’s Republic of China, Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjzl/jwtz/201409/1838257_1.html.  Note that in the 
government’s report, state-owned enterprises refer to those 100% owned by the government; 
it does not include partially state-owned SOEs.  
17 Limin Zhang, Wenbu Tisheng Guoyou Qiye de Guojihua Jingying Nengli (฀步提升国
有企฀的国฀化฀฀能力 ) [Steadily Improving SOEs’ International Management 
Capability], CHINA ECON. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A05 (noting that the official 
government’s report underestimated the SOE’s share in outward FDI because it does not 
account for partially-owned SOEs and according to KPMG’s data, SOEs accounted for 88% 
of China’s overseas mergers and acquisitions for the period of 2009-2011; therefore 
reporting estimate that SOEs should account for 85%-90% of China’s outward FDI stock).  
18 2012 Nian Zhongguo Fei Jinrong Lei Kuaguo Gongsi 100 Qiang (An 2012 Nianmo 
Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Cunliang Paixu) (2012年中国非金融฀跨国公司 100฀(按 2012年
末฀外直接投฀存量排序 )) [The Top 100 China’s Non-Financial Multinational 
Companies in 2012 (Arranged by Direct Outward Investment Stock)] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Commerce, Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjzl/jwtz/201309/1775847_1.html. 
19 MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2012 STATISTICAL BULLETIN 
OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI. 
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3 China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) 
Petroleum SOE under 
SASAC 
4 China Mobile Communication 
Corporation 
Telecom SOE under 
SASAC 
5 Chin Resources (Holdings) Co., 
Ltd. 
Diversified SOE under 
SASAC 
6 China Ocean Shipping (Group) 
Company (COSCO) 
Transportation SOE under 
SASAC 
7 Aluminum Corporation of China Metal SOE under 
SASAC 
8 Sinochem Corporation Chemical SOE under  
SASAC 
9 China Merchant Group Diversified SOE under  
SASAC 
10 China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation 
Construction SOE under  
SASAC 
11 China Unicom Corporation Telecom SOE under  
SASAC 
12 China Minmetals Corporation Metal SOE under  
SASAC 
13 China National Chemical 
Corporation 
Chemical SOE under  
SASAC 
14 CITIC Group Diversified SOE under  
SASAC 
15 China National Cereals, Oils & 
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) 
Food SOE under  
SASAC 
16 China National Aviation Holding 
Corporation 
Transportation SOE under  
SASAC 
17 State Grid Corporation of China Utility SOE under  
SASAC 
18 SinoSteel Corporation Metal SOE under  
SASAC 
19 China Three Gorges Corporation Utility SOE under  
SASAC 
20 Sinotrans & CSC Holdings Co., 
Ltd. 
Logistics SOE under  
SASAC 
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At present, there are 112 SOEs under SASAC’s control.  These 
SOEs are recognized as China’s national champions.  They are organized 
as vertically integrated corporate groups.  Each corporate group has a 
holding company standing at the top of the ownership hierarchy.  The 
holding company is 100% owned by SASAC.  All the companies reported 
in Table 1 are the holding company of a state-owned corporate group.  Each 
holding company controls a large number of subsidiaries including listed 
companies, finance companies, research institutes, and many other related 
firms along the production chain.20    
It has been noted that the holding company has many governance 
features that diverge from prevailing international standards.21  For instance, 
at the time of this writing, only about half of the 112 holding companies 
have successfully established a board of directors.  SASAC and the 
Organization Department (i.e. the human resources department) of the 
Chinese Communist Party exercise the power of appointing top managers 
of the holding companies.  “Political qualities,” including loyalty to the 
Chinese Communist Party, are among the major criteria of managerial 
performance evaluation.22  The holding companies’ close connection with 
the government obviously raises concerns in host countries.  Even if a 
holding company utilizes a listed subsidiary as an investment vehicle, it may 
not shed governance doubts because the holding company often is the 
absolute majority shareholder of the listed subsidiary.23  As shown in the 
following section, regulators in some advanced economies including 
                                                 
20 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 710-711 fig.1 (2013).  
Figure 1 in Lin & Milhaupt’s article well illustrates the organizational structure:  
 
21 Id. at 752. 
22  Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi He Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia Banfa 
(Shixing) (中央企฀฀฀班子和฀฀人฀฀合考核฀价฀法  (฀行 )) [Measures 
Concerning the Integrated Evaluation of the Top Management Teams and Managers of the 
Central Enterprises (Provisional)] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t Communist Party of 
China, Nov. 6, 2009), http://gzw.xinjiang.gov.cn/10050/10090/10012/2010/19547.htm.   
23 Erica Downs, China’s NOCs: Lessons Learned from Adventures Abroad, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 2008, at 30, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2008/7/china-
downs/07_china_downs.pdf. (arguing that foreign investors cannot differentiate the holding 
and the listed subsidiary as the holding controls an absolute majority). 
Chinese Communist Party 
(exercising shadow control rights)
State Council
SASAC
(exercising rights 
as an investor)
100%
Group Boundary
Holding Company
(core company in the group) 
Major Subsidiaries 
(publicly traded)
Other 
Subsidiaries
Finance 
Company
Subsidiaries
>50% >50% >50%
Research 
Institutes
>50%
Other National 
or Provincial 
Corporate 
Groups 
Noneconomic 
Institutions 
(universities, 
etc.)
2015]                                             CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS                   89 
 
Australia, Canada, and the United States have frustrated several potential 
takeovers by Chinese SOEs.  In the face of legitimacy challenges, do 
China’s national champions change their governance practices as they 
globalize?  Do the regulatory regimes in some host countries exert any 
effective influence on the governance reform of China’s national champions? 
 
III. Regulatory Challenges Abroad 
 
Host countries are usually ambivalent toward FDI.  On the one 
hand, FDI is perceived desirable as it promotes economic development.  
On the other hand, a foreign investor may favor the interests of its home 
country or parent company to the detriment of national interests of the 
host country.  To balance economic benefits and national interest 
concerns, many countries have regulatory regimes to scrutinize investment 
by foreign entities.  Table 2 below shows a list of major countries that 
have a regulatory system of foreign investment.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of Foreign Investment Regulatory Regimes24 
 
Country Sources of 
Law and 
Responsible 
Regulator 
Key 
Concerns 
Corporate 
Governance as 
an Explicit 
Factor in Review 
Special Regulation 
for Foreign SOEs 
High-Profiled 
Troubled Cases 
against Chinese SOEs 
Australia 
 
Foreign 
Acquisitions 
and 
Takeover 
Act 1975 
(FETA); 
Foreign 
Acquisitions 
and 
Takeover 
Regulations 
1989; 
Australia’s 
Foreign 
Investment 
Policy 
(AFIP).  
 
Treasurer; 
Foreign 
Investment 
Review 
Board 
(FIRB).  
“National 
interest” 
including 
national 
security, 
competition, 
other 
Australian 
Government 
Policies 
(including 
tax), impact 
on the 
economy and 
the 
community, 
character of 
the investor. 
When considering 
“the character of 
the investor”, the 
government 
considers “the 
corporate 
governance 
practices of 
foreign investors.” 
(AFIP)  
All foreign 
government investors 
must notify the 
Government and get 
prior approval before 
making a direct 
investment in 
Australia, regardless 
of the value of the 
investment. 
 
Where a proposal 
involves a foreign 
government investor, 
the Government 
considers if the 
investment is 
commercial in nature 
or if the investor may 
be pursuing broader 
political or strategic 
objectives that may 
be contrary to 
Australia’s national 
interest. This 
includes assessing 
whether the 
prospective 
investor’s 
governance 
Minmetals/ OZ 
Minerals (2009): 
approval conditioned 
on excluding the 
Prominent Hill mine, 
based on national 
security as it is located 
close to a sensitive 
military zone in the 
deserts of outback 
South Australia. 
 
Chinalco/Rio Tino 
(2009): as the 
international 
commodity markets 
greatly improved 
during the prolonged 
regulatory approval 
process, Rio Tino 
unilaterally ended the 
deal one week before 
the regulator’s meeting 
to decide on the deal.   
 
                                                 
24 Information about the regulations in France, Germany and Japan is from United States 
Government Accountability Office, Laws and Policies Regulating Foreign Investment in 10 
Countries, (Feb, 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf. 
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arrangements could 
facilitate actual or 
potential control by a 
foreign government. 
(AFIP) 
 
Canada 
 
Investment 
Canada Act 
1985; 
Regulations 
Respecting 
Investment 
in Canada; 
National 
Security 
Review of 
Investments 
Regulations. 
 
Industry 
Canada; 
Canadian 
Heritage. 
 
 
 
“Net benefit” 
to Canada 
(including 
economic 
impact) and 
national 
security 
When assessing 
whether a deal is 
of net benefit to 
Canada, the 
Minister will 
examine the 
corporate 
governance and 
reporting structure 
of the non-
Canadian. This 
examination will 
include whether 
the non-Canadian 
adheres to 
Canadian 
standards of 
corporate 
governance 
(including, for 
example, 
commitments to 
transparency and 
disclosure, 
independent 
members of the 
board of directors, 
independent audit 
committees and 
equitable 
treatment of 
shareholders), and 
to Canadian laws 
and practices, 
including 
adherence to free 
market principles. 
(The SOE 
Guidelines) 
“Guidelines on 
Investment by State-
Owned Enterprises” 
(The SOE 
Guidelines, first 
issued in 2007; 
amended in 2012) 
 
The Minister will 
assess whether a 
Canadian business to 
be acquired by a non-
Canadian that is an 
SOE will likely 
operate on a 
commercial basis, 
including with regard 
to: where to export; 
where to process; the 
participation of 
Canadians in its 
operations in Canada 
and elsewhere; 
the impact of the 
investment on 
productivity and 
industrial efficiency 
in Canada; support of 
on-going innovation, 
research and 
development in 
Canada; and the 
appropriate level of 
capital expenditures 
to maintain the 
Canadian business in 
a globally 
competitive position. 
 
CNOOC/Nexen 
(2012): approval 
conditioned on 
CNOOC’s 
commitment to some 
undertakings including 
listing CNOOC on the 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange. 
USA 
 
Exon-Florio 
Amendment 
to the 
Defense 
Production 
Act of 1950, 
as 
Amended; 
Guidance 
Concerning 
the National 
Security 
Review 
Conducted 
by the 
Committee 
on Foreign 
Investment 
in the United 
States 
 
The Foreign 
Investment 
and National 
Security Act 
National 
Security 
When evaluating 
transactions by 
foreign 
government-
controlled entities, 
CFIUS considers, 
among other 
factors, “whether 
governance 
structures are in 
place to ensure 
independence.” 
(The CFIUS 
Guidance) 
In reviewing foreign 
government-
controlled 
transactions, CFIUS 
considers, among all 
other relevant facts 
and circumstances, 
the extent to which 
the basic investment 
management policies 
of the investor 
require investment 
decisions to be based 
solely on commercial 
grounds; the degree 
to which, in practice, 
the investor’s 
management and 
investment decisions 
are exercised 
independently from 
the controlling 
government, 
including whether 
governance 
CNOOC/Unocal 
(2005): CNOOC 
withdrew its bid in the 
midst of intensive 
political opposition 
played out in Congress 
and dissatisfaction 
with the CFIUS review 
process; its competing 
bidder, Chevron, won 
the deal at the end.  
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of 2007 
(FINSA) 
 
Committee 
on Foreign 
Investment 
in the United 
States 
(CFIUS). 
 
structures are in 
place to ensure 
independence; the 
degree of 
transparency and 
disclosure of the 
purpose, investment 
objectives, 
institutional 
arrangements, and 
financial information 
of the investor; and 
the degree to which 
the investor complies 
with applicable 
regulatory and 
disclosure 
requirements of the 
countries in which 
they invest. (The 
CFIUS Guidance) 
 
 
EU 
 
Currently 
there is no 
foreign 
investment 
review at the 
EU level. 
 
None None None None 
France 
 
Law 2004-
1343; 
Decree 
2005-1739 
 
Public order, 
public safety, 
national 
Defense 
 
None None None 
Germany 
 
2004 
Amendment 
to 
1961Foreign 
Trade and 
Payments 
Act. 
 
Ensure 
essential 
security 
interests, 
prevent 
disturbance 
of peaceful 
international 
coexistence 
or foreign 
relations 
 
None None None 
Japan 
 
1991 
Amendment 
to the 
Foreign 
Exchange 
and Foreign 
Trade Act of 
1949. 
 
National 
security, 
public order, 
public safety, 
or the 
economy 
None None None 
 
While each country has unique characteristics in its own system to 
regulate foreign investment, in many ways the systems are quite similar to 
each other. Although the regulatory scope varies significantly, regulations 
that restrict foreign investment are generally based on national security.  For 
instance, Australia, Canada, and Japan also formally include economic 
concerns as part of the criteria for foreign investment reviews.  At present, 
there is no foreign investment regulation at the EU level, but there are some 
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variations among European countries. France and Germany have regulatory 
reviews based on national security, whereas countries including Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and the Netherlands (not 
shown in Table) do not have any investment regulations related to national 
security interests.25 
Australia, Canada and the United States probably have the most 
detailed regulations and relatively active records in coping with investment 
by foreign SOEs.  In Australia, all investments by foreign government-
controlled entities are subject to regulatory review, regardless the size of the 
investment.26  Investments by other entities are reviewable only when the 
transaction involves certain sectors and are above a certain monetary 
threshold.27  
In Canada, the regulatory regime operates under the Investment 
Canada Act.28  When a foreign investor acquires control of a Canadian 
business and the asset value of the Canadian business being acquired equals 
or exceeds a certain threshold, the foreign investor must prove that the 
investment is of net benefit to Canada. 29   In 2007, Industry Canada 
promulgated the SOE Guidelines under the Act partly as a reaction to 
growing public concerns over foreign SOEs’ acquisition of controlling 
stakes in prominent Canadian businesses.30  In 2009, the Investment Canada 
Act was amended to allow the government to block foreign investments 
based on national security concerns.31  Recently, in 2012, the Canadian 
government further revised the SOE Guidelines and increased scrutiny, 
along with the announcement of approving the contentious acquisitions by 
Petronas and CNOOC.32  The latest guidelines broaden the definition of 
SOE, covering any “enterprise that is owned, controlled or influenced, 
directly or indirectly by a foreign government.”33  
In the United States, parties to a transaction that could result in 
control of a U.S. business by a foreign person may file a notice with the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to 
determine whether such transaction would present any national security 
risks. As stated in the CFIUS Guidance, foreign government control is 
obviously an important factor though it does not necessarily, in itself, pose 
                                                 
25 Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34 
NORTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. & BUS. 395, 433 (2014). 
26  Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 2015, 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/Australias_Foreign_Investment_Policy_June_
2015.pdf.  
27 Id. 
28 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28. 
29  Investment Canada Act Guidelines – Investment by State-Owned Enterprises, 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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a national security risk. 34   Other factors such as whether appropriate 
corporate governance structure is in place to ensure the investing entity’s 
independence of the foreign government shall be considered as well.35  
Similar to the United States, both Australia and Canada include corporate 
governance structure, among other things, as an important concern.36 
 In recent years, a number of prominent Chinese SOEs have 
encountered regulatory challenges in Australia, Canada, and the United 
States.  Loosely defined regulatory concepts, including national security 
and interests in foreign investment regulations, provide ample political 
space to galvanize public debate in the host country.  For instance, in 2005, 
CNOOC Limited (a listed subsidiary of an oil SOE under SASAC’s control) 
attempted to acquire Unocal, a U.S. oil producer.  The CNOOC-Unocal deal 
faced unprecedented political opposition by the U.S. Congress based on the 
claims that the takeover would threaten US national security. Congress, 
through its legislative power, significantly dragged the CFIUS review 
process.  The politicized regulatory review process eventually forced 
CNOOC to retreat from the bidding war and the American-owned Chevron 
Corporation won the deal.37  
 The Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal in Australia faced a similar challenge.  
In 2009, Chinalco, one of the SOEs under SASAC, planned to acquire an 
18% stake of Anglo-Australian mining giant, Rio Tinto.  But the regulatory 
process was prolonged in the debate of the consequences of giving Chinese 
SOEs access to an enormous trove of natural resources in Australia.  Rio 
Tinto unilaterally terminated the deal just days before Australian regulators 
were expected to impose tough conditions for their approval of it. 38  
Another prominent case in Australia was the sale of OZ Minerals to China 
Minmetals Non Ferrous Metals Co., Ltd (Minmetals), a subsidiary of China 
Minmetals Corporation. China Minmetals Corporation is a central SOE 
under SASAC’s control.  The Australian government announced that it 
would not approve the transaction if it included the Prominent Hill 
operation based on national security concerns.  A subsequent agreement 
was reached whereby Minmetals would purchase OZ Minerals assets except 
for Prominent Hill.39 
                                                 
34 Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by CFIUS, 73 Fed. Reg. 
74567, 74571 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES, 
ch. 5 (2006). 
38 Dana Cimilluca et al., Rio Tinto Scuttles Its Deal with Chinalco, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124411140142684779.  
39 Peter Smith, Oz Minerals Shareholders Accept Minmetals Bid, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9056355a-559f-11de-ab7e-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rOmaygK9.  
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Recently, CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen also aroused great public 
concerns in Canada. After a delayed review process, the Canadian 
government finally approved the deal with conditions including requiring 
CNOOC’s listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange. These conditions were 
meant to ensure that CNOOC's corporate governance and transparency were 
in compliance with Canadian standards.40  
An overview of the foreign investment laws shows that a foreign 
SOE’s relation with the government in its home country is the root of 
regulatory concerns.  Does a foreign SOE act as an independent enterprise 
for commercial interests or as an agent of the foreign government pursuing 
political interests?  Regulatory regimes often consider whether adequate 
corporate governance structure is in place to shield the SOE management 
from interference by its home country government.  If a foreign SOE’s 
governance structure demonstrates independence of its home country 
government, the SOE will be more likely to obtain regulatory approval and 
public support in the host country.  It suggests that the regulatory regimes 
scrutinizing investment by foreign SOEs may act as a potential mechanism 
to change investing foreign SOEs’ corporate governance.  The following 
section proposes a framework to analyze how institutional environments 
including corporate governance and foreign investment regulatory 
institutions in the host country may affect the governance of foreign SOEs.  
Based on this analytical framework, this Article will make hypotheses 
regarding whether globalization through foreign investment and overseas 
listing may prompt Chinese national champions to change their corporate 
governance practices. 
  
IV. Theoretical Framework of Globalization and Governance 
Change 
 
Relevant international business studies have investigated how 
institutional distance between the home country and the host country would 
affect a firm’s entry modes and subsequent performance of the investment 
vehicle in the host country. 41   This body of literature often draws on 
sociological theories to explain institutional disparity between the home 
country and the host country as an important determinant of a firm’s 
                                                 
40 Shawn Mccarthy and Steven Chase, Ottawa Approves Nexen, Progress Foreign Takeover, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/ottawa-approves-nexen-progress-foreign-takeovers/article6107548/.  
41 Majid Abdi & Preet S. Aulakh, Do Country-Level Institutional Frameworks and Interfirm 
Governance Arrangements Substitute or Complement in International Business 
Relationships? 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 477, 477 (2012); Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State 
Ownership Effect on Firms’ FDI Ownership Decisions under Institutional Pressure: A Study 
of Chinese Outward-Investing Firms, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 264, 264 (2012); Klaus E Meyer 
et al., Overcoming Distrust: How State-Owned Enterprises Adapt Their Foreign Entries to 
Institutional Pressures Abroad, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1005, 1020 (2014). 
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strategy to enter the foreign country.  Existing literature, however, has paid 
little attention to how a company’s outward investment would create 
inbound influence on the company itself.  This inattention is explainable as 
the dominant players in the global investment market have traditionally 
been firms in advanced economies. Firms in advanced economies have little 
reason to emulate immature institutions in less developed countries.  But 
the emergence of multinational firms from China and other developing 
countries calls for an evaluation of any effects in the reverse direction.  
Following similar sociological thoughts in the international business 
literature, this Article uses network analysis and institutional theories in 
economic sociology to build an analytical framework of how a firm may 
change its corporate governance practices due to institutional pressure faced 
in the host country.  This Article will apply this framework to hypothesize 
how “going global” may influence Chinese national champions’ 
governance practices.  
Sociological network analysis is based on a fundamental 
assumption that interactions between social actors (whether individuals, 
organizations, or nations) shape their behavior.  Social actors are viewed as 
interdependent, linking with one another by social ties through which 
information and other resources are channeled.42  For instance, firms may 
be linked with one another though ownership ties (i.e. holding shares in 
another firm) or interlocking directorships (i.e. two firms sharing a common 
director).  Material and non-material resources may flow through the 
concrete relationships and influence behavior or outcomes.  Rich 
sociological evidence shows that inter-firm networks play an important role 
in sharing risks and diffusing information.43  
From a sociological network perspective, foreign investment is 
relational in the sense that it creates not only flows of money, but also 
channels of influence.  The relational nature of investment becomes 
particularly complex for overseas investment across different institutional 
environments.  Institutional theory in economic sociology suggests that an 
organization’s behavior is influenced by the economic, legal and political 
environment in which it operates.44  This environment creates normative 
forces that drive how an organization should operate, regardless of whether 
a particular normative practice is useful to the organization’s functioning.  
Conformity to institutional expectations helps the organization acquire 
                                                 
42 Mak Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 481 (1985).  
43  For a summary of this body of sociological literature, see generally Joel M. Podolny & 
Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 57, 57 (1998). 
44 For the seminal work of institutional theory in sociology, see generally Paul J. DiMaggio 
& Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983); John W. Meyer & 
Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 
AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977). 
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legitimacy.  Different environments impose different normative pressures 
and thus produce different organizational structures and behavior.  When an 
organization born of and operating in a certain environment enters a new 
environment, it may be under normative pressure to change its 
organizational structures or behavior so as to adapt to and establish 
legitimacy in the new environment.  The normative pressure may be more 
intense when the new environment is dissimilar from the original 
environment.45   
As different countries have different institutional environments, 
this relational and institutional approach suggests that the potential of a 
SOE’s corporate governance change depends on the institutional disparity 
between the SOE’s origin country and its investment destination country.  
In other words, institutional distance between the origin country and the 
destination country of investment matters in evaluating the potential of SOE 
governance change.  While there are many dimensions of institutional 
environments, this Article focuses on corporate governance institutions, 
which are a main concern in foreign investment reviews.  Table 3 below 
illustrates the basic idea.  
 
Table 3: Institutional Distance and the Potential of SOE Governance Change 
 
 Destination Country 
 
Strong Corporate  
Governance Regime 
 
Weak Corporate 
Governance Regime 
Origin 
Country 
Strong 
Corporate 
Governance 
Regime 
 
(High) Institutional 
match  Little 
need/pressure to 
change/improve 
governance 
 
 
 
(High) Institutional 
mismatch  Little 
inbound influence on 
governance, but 
potentially positive 
effects along FDI on 
destination countries 
 
Weak 
Corporate 
Governance 
Regime 
 
(High) Institutional 
mismatch  High 
suspicion and pressure 
to change 
 
 
(High) Institutional 
match  Little 
need/pressure to 
change/improve 
governance 
 
 
                                                 
45 Meyer et al. supra note 41, at 340. 
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For analytical convenience, a country can either be a (relatively) 
strong governance regime or a (relatively) weak governance regime.  
Admittedly, this dichotomous categorization may be oversimplified given 
the complexity of assessing the quality of corporate governance institutions.  
Several seminal attempts to compare corporate governance across countries 
through quantitative indicators have been subject to cautions and 
criticisms.46  The quantitative governance indices present limitations and 
inconsistencies among themselves.  Nevertheless, their results constantly 
show that most developed countries rank high on the indices and most 
developing countries including China gravitate toward the bottom.  There 
should be little controversy if China is placed in the weak governance 
category and developed countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United 
States in the strong governance category. 
When both the origin country and the destination country are of the 
same type of governance regime (either strong or weak), it is labeled as an 
institutional match.  A high degree of institutional match indicates there 
would be of little normative pressure on the investing SOE or the investing 
state-owner to change its governance practices.  In other words, there would 
be only marginal inbound influence on the SOE governance from such 
outward investment.  The institutional match provides a comfort zone for 
the SOE to continue its traditional practices even when they operate across 
national boundaries.  The upper left cell and the lower right cell in Table 3 
show the scenarios of institutional match.  The upper left cell shows a 
scenario in which an SOE from a strong corporate governance regime 
invests in a parallel regime.  An example is Statoil, a Norwegian oil SOE, 
investing in Canada.47  The lower right cell shows a situation where an SOE 
                                                 
46 The work that sparked using empirical methods in comparative corporate governance is 
Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113 (1998).  Efforts on 
ranking national corporate governance systems include: GMI, Country Rankings from 
Governance Metrics International, http://www.gmiratings.com/BreakingNews.aspx; 
WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2001-2014, 
http://www.weforum.org/reports; Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Corporate 
Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance 
Regulations (CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-17, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557627.  For critiques, see Ruth V. 
Aguilera & Kurt A. Desender, Challenges in the Measuring of Comparative Corporate 
Governance: A Review of the Main Indices, 8 RES. METHODOLOGY IN STRATEGY AND MGMT. 
289, 290 (2012) (arguing that there are challenges to compare corporate governance 
effectiveness in different settings with a governance index); Sanjai Bhagat et al., The 
Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1803 (2008) 
(arguing that “governance indices are highly imperfect instruments” for various corporate 
issues); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
467, 467 (2010) (arguing that the corrected “antidirector rights index” fails to support widely 
influential claims).  
47  See STATOIL, STATOIL IN CANADA: FACTS, Statoil (2014), 
http://www.statoil.com/no/About/Worldwide/NorthAmerica/canada/OilSands/Downloads/s
tatoilincanada.pdf (introducing Statoil’s work in Canada).  
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from a weak governance regime invests in another weaker regime, such as 
Sinopec, a Chinese SOE, investing in Nigeria. 
To the contrary, when there is a high degree of institutional 
mismatch between the origin country and the destination country, 
institutional conformity would be a source of pressure to change governance 
practices.  But the direction of governance impact runs in different ways, 
depending on where the stronger institutions are located.  The upper right 
cell in Table 3 illustrates a situation where a SOE from a strong governance 
regime invests in a weaker regime. An example is Norsk Hydro (controlled 
by the Norwegian government), which invests in Mozambique. 48   The 
governance impact tends to run in the direction from the better regime to 
the weaker regime.  The governance implication of this type of investment 
has been well-examined in the FDI literature concerning how FDI from 
advanced economies benefit (or harm) domestic firms and institutional 
development of emerging markets.49  
The lower left cell in Table 3 illustrates a scenario where an SOE 
from a weak governance regime invests in a strong regime, such as CNOOC 
investing in the United States.  As shown in Section III, a number of 
advanced economies including Australia, Canada and the United States 
have enhanced review standards for foreign SOE investments.  Corporate 
governance is a main factor considered in these review processes.  
Moreover, while the investment review systems are based on statutes or 
regulations, the process is often politicized because governments have 
considerable discretion in interpreting the meaning of “national interests,” 
“net benefits,” and “national security.”  As a result, foreign SOEs may face 
not only legal and market pressure, but also political pressure to change 
governance.  This case of institutional mismatch has the greatest potential 
of generating positive influence on the investing SOE’s governance 
practices.  This Article labels this scenario as positive institutional mismatch, 
where there may be positive inward influence derived from the outward 
investment. 
The gist of Table 3 suggests that China’s SOEs are more likely to 
adopt internationally-recognized corporate governance practices when they 
invest in places of positive institutional mismatch and are much less likely 
                                                 
48  See Hydro Worldwide, NORSK HYDRO, fig.1, http://www.hydro.com/en/About-
Hydro/Hydro-worldwide/ (illustrating the worldwide activities of Norsk Hydro and its 
relative involvement in each country).  
49 Brian J. Aitken & Ann E. Harrison, Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. 89 AM. ECON. REV. 605, 605 (1999); Anh Dang, How 
Foreign Direct Investment Promote Institutional Quality: Evidence from Vietnam, 41 J. 
COMP. ECON. 1054, 1054 (2013); Holger Gorg & David Greenaway, Much Ado about 
Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? 19 WORLD 
BANK RES. OBSERVER 171, 171 (2004); Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through 
Backward Linkages, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 605, 605 (2004). 
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to do so if they mainly invest in places of institutional match (i.e. countries 
with similarly weak or even worse institutional conditions).  It raises an 
empirical question: in what types of foreign countries do Chinese SOEs 
mainly invest?  Do Chinese SOEs mainly invest in countries of positive 
institutional mismatch, such as the United States?  Extant literature has 
focused on Chinese SOEs’ outward investment in Africa.  While the SOEs 
have contributed some significant economic development to Africa, their 
governance, social, and environmental practices fail to meet international 
standards by a wide margin. 50   If Africa or other countries with weak 
corporate governance regimes are the main investment destinations, it 
indicates that Chinese SOEs’ global expansion would face little normative 
pressure to change their governance practices.  But governance reform 
potential is more likely to occur if they mainly invest in advanced 
economies, especially those with regulatory processes scrutinizing 
investments by foreign SOEs.        
The macro-institutional distance between the origin country and the 
destination country of investment provides a broad-brush baseline of 
foreign SOEs’ governance change potential.  But not all SOEs, even from 
the same country, are the same.  There are organizational-level variations 
that may bring about different inbound influence from outward investment.  
This Article considers two micro-organizational conditions, which are 
commonly examined in international business literature: the firm’s entry 
modes and types of investing entities. 
Existing literature has shown how institutional distance between 
the home country and the host country may influence a firm’s 
internationalization strategies.51  A recent study shows that Chinese SOEs 
                                                 
50  See Namukale Chintu et al., Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: Myths and 
Realities. IVEY BUS. J. (Mar./Apr. 2013), 
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-in-africa-
myths-and-realities/ (stating that Chinese SOEs fall short of “good governance” standards 
traditionally accepted in the international community, but these shortcomings are due to 
China’s limited experience in internationalization); Patrick J. Kennan, Curse or Cure - China, 
Africa, and the Effects of Unconditional Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 84, 88 (2009), 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss1/4 (arguing that China’s investments in 
Africa may have negative effects on local populations’ social welfare).  
51 See, e.g., Lorraine Eden & Stewart R Miller, Distance Matters: Liability Of Foreignness, 
Institutional Distance And Ownership Strategy, 16 ADVANCES IN INT’L MGMT. 187, 189 
(2004) (suggesting that the key element of liability of foreignness is institutional distance 
and examines the manner in which institutional distance affects the liability of foreignness); 
Saul Estrin et al., The Impact of Institutional and Human Resource Distance on International 
Entry Strategies, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 1171, 1171 (2009) (exploring the role of institutional 
and human resource distances on foreign investment strategy); Dean Xu & Oded Shenkar, 
Institutional Distance and The Multinational Enterprise, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV.  608, 608 
(2002) (analyzing the effect of institutional distance on the normative, regulatory and 
cognitive dimensions on foreign market entry strategies); Delia Ionascu et al., Institutional 
Distance and International Business Strategies in Emerging Economies (William Davidson 
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tend to choose joint ventures rather than acquisitions as the entry mode, 
because acquiring an existing business increases the likelihood of facing 
regulatory or political hurdles. 52   While the choice of entry modes is 
affected by institutional distance between the home country and the host 
country, once the choice has been made, the choice can subsequently 
produce different levels of inbound influence derived from such outward 
activity.  
Common entry modes into foreign markets include two categories: 
equity-based and non-equity based.  Non-equity based entry modes are 
exporting and licensing.  Because non-equity based entry modes have little 
exposure to the local corporate governance system of the host country, it 
would induce only marginal inbound influence on the foreign SOE’s 
governance.  Equity-based entry modes can be divided into two types by 
ownership: wholly-owned and partially-owned operations.  Wholly-owned 
operations are greenfield investments (i.e. setting up wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or branches) and full acquisition of existing local firms in the 
host country.  Partially-owned operations refer to partial acquisition of 
existing local firms or setting up joint ventures with local firms in the host 
country.  Among all these equity-based types, greenfield investment is 
probably most integrated with the SOE’s headquarters and least interacts 
with corporate governance of local firms in the host country.  Therefore, the 
inbound influence on the governance practices of the investing SOE (parent 
company) in the home country can be limited.  Compared to greenfield 
investment, full acquisition will result in a higher level of exposure to local 
corporate governance practices in the host country.   
Takeovers by foreign investors are often subject to regulatory 
approval conditioned on some governance changes of the investing SOE.  
Moreover, existing practices in the acquired company may continue and 
thus potentially diffuse to the parent SOE in the home country.  Partially 
owned operations also possess great potential of inbound influence.  Partial 
acquisitions and joint ventures require SOEs to negotiate and arrange 
governance structures with local shareholders.  The ownership interaction 
and integration create opportunities for foreign SOEs to learn the operation 
of the corporate governance system in the host country.  Table 4 
summarizes the types of entry modes and the levels of potential inbound 
influence on corporate governance of SOEs in the home country.  
 
Table 4: Entry Modes and Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate 
Governance 
 
                                                 
Institute, Working Paper No. 728), (2004) (arguing that the “impact of distance varies with 
the different aspects of the concept of institutional distance”).  
52 Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, supra note 41 at 264.  
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Entry Modes Potential Inbound Influence on Corporate 
Governance 
Non-Equity Based  
             Exporting Low 
             Licensing Low 
Equity-Based  
            Wholly-Owned 
Operations 
 
             Green-Field 
Investment  
Low-Medium 
             Full Acquisition Medium-High 
             Partially-Owned 
Operations 
 
             Partial Acquisition Medium-High 
             Joint Ventures Medium High 
 
When deciding how to invest in a foreign country, firms need to 
decide whether to invest directly itself or through subsidiaries.  As 
explained in Section II, a Chinese national champion is typically organized 
as a vertically integrated corporate group with a holding company 
controlling multiple layers of subsidiaries.  If the holding company itself 
engages in foreign investment, the holding company will directly encounter 
normative pressure in the host country, which suggests great potential for a 
change in governance within the holding company.  However, if foreign 
investment is mainly carried out through overseas subsidiaries, the holding 
company may hide behind the layers of ownership and avoid governance 
reform.  This hierarchical ownership structure creates degrees of distance 
between the holding company and its overseas subsidiaries.  On the one 
hand, the layered ownership may shield overseas subsidiaries from the 
state-owner’s influence, which allows more freedom for overseas 
subsidiaries to adopt local corporate governance practices in the host 
country.  On the other hand, the extended distance may weaken the potential 
inbound influence on the holding company.  Therefore, it suggests a 
hypothesis that foreign investments made directly by the holding company 
itself rather than through its subsidiaries are more likely to elicit change in 
the holding company’s governance practices. 
Finally, in addition to FDI, overseas listing is another important 
strategy for Chinese SOEs to build international equity connections.  Some 
Chinese SOEs have listed shares in the world’s leading capital markets 
including Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom.  The institutional relationship between China and the major 
capital markets can be characterized as an institutional mismatch.  
According to the bonding theory in corporate governance literature, firms 
with a view to improve corporate governance, particularly those from 
emerging markets, may bond themselves to a better governance regime 
102 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
through cross listing their shares. 53   By cross-listing in a stronger 
institutional regime, such as the United States, Chinese SOEs must comply 
with stricter standards and consequently have better governance.  A study 
shows that Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong have better pay-
performance sensitivity than the mainland firms without cross-listing and 
the effect is greater for SOEs than private firms.54  Another study also finds 
that Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore have better corporate 
governance quality (measured by a combined index) than their counterparts 
with only domestic listings.55  Scholars also find that China’s overseas-
listed SOEs have more professional boards of directors, greater accounting 
conservatism, higher investment efficiency, and better stock performance 
than their domestically listed counterparts. 56   Considering that overseas 
listed firms are major members of China’s national champions and their top 
management teams (including boards of directors) often overlap with those 
of the holding companies, the overseas-listed subsidiaries may diffuse 
modern corporate governance practices, such as the use of independent 
directors, back to their holding companies.  It suggests that the national 
champions that have an overseas listed subsidiary are more likely to engage 
in corporate governance reform than those without one. 
Overall, the theoretical framework built with common ideas in 
relevant international business literature assumes that Chinese SOEs are 
responsive to market and other institutional pressures in host countries, but 
the responsiveness is also affected by organizational factors, such as entry 
modes and investment structure.57  These theoretical predictions are subject 
to empirical investigation. 
 
V. Empirical Evidence 
 
A. Data and Methodology 
This Article empirically investigates whether internationalization 
effectively drives the governance reform of China’s national champions, the 
SOEs, under SASAC’s control.  The period of investigation in this study is 
                                                 
53 John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 
1757 (2002). 
54 Wei Chi & Haiyan Zhang, Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-
Listing? Evidence from China, 21 CHINA ECON. REV. 150, 150 (2010).  
55  Ling Mei Cong, Earnings Quality and Corporate Governance Bonding, 10 CORP. 
OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 183, 183 (2013). 
56 Mingyi Hung et al., Political Relations and Overseas Stock Exchange Listing: Evidence 
from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 2-4, (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/acy2/Staff/tjwong/HungWongZhangAug2008v8.pdf. 
57 Meyer et al. supra note 41, at 1009-10. 
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from 2003, the year of SASAC’s establishment, to 2013.  As of the end of 
2013, there were 113 SOEs controlled by SASAC.58  
Governance reform, as the dependent variable, will be measured in 
two ways: whether the SOE has any outside directors on the board and 
whether the SOE’s top management team includes any foreign-educated 
executives.  In the past decade, the most important governance reform of 
these central SOEs has been the institutionalization of the board of directors 
and independent directors.  In 2004, SASAC began to experiment with the 
idea of establishing the board of directors in SOEs under its supervision.  
According to SASAC’s initial design, the board of directors generally 
should be comprised of no less than nine directors and at least two should 
be outside directors; the percentage of outside directors should gradually 
increase with improvement in the supply of outside directors.59  As per 
SASAC’s most recent rules, the board size generally should be between 
seven and thirteen directors, with a majority as outside directors.60  Note 
that although most of the central SOEs did not have a board of directors 
before SASAC’s policy, there were a number of exceptions.  For instance, 
China Chengtong Holdings Group Ltd, a diversified industrial group, 
established the board of directors as early as 1992.  These pre-SASAC 
boards were comprised of insiders only and some had only chairman and 
vice-chairman without any other board members.61  Unlike the pre-SASAC 
board, the new board model that SASAC promotes features outside 
directors.   
                                                 
58 At the beginning of SASAC’s establishment (2003), there were close to 200 SOEs under 
SASAC’s control.  SASAC has a goal to reduce the number of the SOEs down to 50-100, 
mainly through the strategies of mergers and acquisitions among the enterprises.  This 
Article focuses on the reform pattern of the existing 113 SOEs.  For the list of the central 
SOEs, see Yangqi Minglu ( 央 企 名 录 ) [Name List of SOEs], 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/c1725422/content.html.  
59   Guanyu Guoyou Duzi Gongsi Dongshihui Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) (关于国
有独฀公司董事会建฀的指฀意฀（฀行）) [Directive Opinion on the Building of the 
Board of Directors in Wholly-State-Owned Companies] (promulgated by the State-Owned 
Asset Supervision & Administration Commission of the State Council, published June 10, 
2004) No. 229, art. 16, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85921/c359263/content.html. 
60  Notice of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council on Issuing the Interim Measures for the Standard Operation of the Board of 
Directors of a Central Enterprise in the Pilot Program on Board of Directors, (promulgated 
by the State-owned Asset Supervision & Administration Commission of the State Council, 
Mar. 20, 2009), art.22, CLI.4.118357(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
61  Hongye Guo, Waibu Dongshi Dongshihui Shidian de Tupodian – Fang Zhongguo 
Chengtong Jituan Dongshizhang Mazhengwu (外部董事董事会฀点的突破点 – ฀中国฀
通集฀董事฀฀正武 ) [A Breakthrough of the Experiment of Boards with Outside 
Directors – An Interview with the Chairman of China Chengtong Holdings Group: Zhengwu 
Ma], DIRECTORS & BOARDS, no. 1, 2009, at 
http://www.dongshihui.com.cn/Magazine/ArticleDetail/551.  
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The adoption of outside directors creates the appearance that 
China’s SOEs are converging with the international standard (or the Anglo-
Saxon model).  While this governance change could be more in form than 
substance, as the board of directors lacks the power to appoint top managers 
and outside directors are often retired government officials or former SOE 
executives, it may be an encouraging step forward to substantive 
governance change.  This Article uses the existence of outside directors on 
the board to represent a type of governance change.62  The data regarding 
whether and when the SOE has a board of directors and outside directors 
were manually collected from the personnel appointments announcements 
and enterprise reform releases posted on SASAC’s website.  Corporate 
websites, annual reports, securities prospectuses and news reports are also 
used as supplementary sources.  According to the data collected through 
this methodology, as of 2013, forty-five of the 113 SOEs had at least one 
outside independent director on the board.63  
Whether the SOE has any foreign educated executive is the other 
indicator of governance change.  As the SOEs become multinational firms, 
their management teams may include professionals with international 
experience.  My previous research shows that the SOE executive labor 
market is overwhelmingly dominated by system-insiders and only a 
marginal minority of the CEOs have any foreign education experience.64  
Staffing with foreign-educated executives is a change of this governance 
tradition.  This Article collected data on educational backgrounds of the 
CEOs and vice CEOs of the 113 SOEs as of 2013.  Biographic information 
was collected from corporate websites, annual reports and prospectuses, 
government websites and documents, industrial association websites, and 
news reports.  There are 639 executives (113 CEOs and 526 vice CEOs).  
Of the 639 executives, fifty-six hold a foreign degree; and of the 113 SOEs, 
thirty-six have at least one foreign-educated executive.  
Internationalization, as the independent variable, will be focused on 
international equity linkages.  As illustrated in Section IV, equity 
connections have greater potential to trigger governance change, compared 
to non-equity connections, such as exporting.  International equity 
connections may be constructed in many forms and will be tested in the 
following ways.  First, international equity connections can be made 
through cross-border joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions.  Data on 
                                                 
62 If the SOE has at least an independent director, it is coded as 1; if not, it is coded as 0.  It 
would be ideal to use the number of independent directors as a dependent variable.  However, 
in many cases, the exact number of independent directors cannot be confirmed. 
63 Note that there are cases where the board of directors was announced to be established but 
the positions of outside directors were not filled or could not be confirmed through publically 
available data.  Such cases were not included in the study.  This typically happened for firms 
that announced the intention to establish a board in 2012 or 2013.   
64 Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career 
Approach, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743, 770 (2013). 
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cross-border joint ventures as well as mergers and acquisitions were 
manually collected from the SDC Platinum Database.  The transactions 
include deals by the parent company and its subsidiaries in the period of 
2003-2011.  An SOE’s degree of internationalization is operationalized as 
the number of deals accumulated from 2003 to year t-1.65  Year t is the data 
year for the dependent variable.  Correlation coefficients will be computed 
to examine the relationship between the accumulated number of deals (at 
year t-1) and the dependent variables (at year t).   
Second, the central SOEs’ overseas greenfield establishments are 
another type of equity connections that expose the SOEs to foreign 
institutional pressure.  Data on the number of the central SOEs’ overseas 
subsidiaries were collected from the Directory of Overseas Investment 
Institutions, a database maintained by the Ministry of Commerce of China.  
The database contains the new establishments of overseas investment 
entities subject to the Ministry of Commerce’s approval.66  While not all 
establishments of overseas operations are subject to regulatory approval, the 
data can serve as an estimate of the number of overseas greenfield 
subsidiaries.67  The database covers the central SOEs’ investments as early 
as 1983, but most of the investment occurred after 2000, the year in which 
the “going global” policy was formally introduced.  According to the 
database, as of 2012, the central SOEs established 1,680 overseas 
operations.  The degree of internationalization is measured as the 
accumulated number of overseas subsidiaries toward year t-1.  Correlation 
coefficients will show the relationship between the accumulated number of 
subsidiaries (at year t-1) and the dependent variables (at year t).   
Third, overseas listing is another way to build international equity 
connections.  Simple linear regression will be used to examine the 
relationship between the time of overseas listing and the time of introducing 
independent directors.  
                                                 
65 Ideally, it would also include the volume of the transactions.  Unfortunately, the SDC 
Platinum Database does not provide the dollar amount of many of the transactions.  
66 The database is accessible at Jingwai Touzi Qiye (Jigou) Minglu (境外投฀企฀（机构）
名 录 ) [Name List of Overseas Investment Companies (Agencies)], 
http://wszw.hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/fecp/fem/corp/fem_cert_stat_view_list.jsp.  
67  Guowuyuan Guanyu Touzi Tizhi Gaige de Jueding (国฀院关于投฀体制改革的决定) 
[Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System], Guo Fa [2004] No.20, 
(promulgated by the State Council, July 16, 2004, effective July 16, 2004), LEXIS China 
Online, htttp://www.lexiscn.com (stating the State Council’s Decision declares that all of the 
central SOEs’ overseas investments should be subject to approval or notice, depending on 
the size of the investment); Jingwai Touzi Guanli Banfa (境外投฀管理฀法) [Measures on 
the Administration of Overseas Investment] Order of the Ministry of Commerce [2009] No. 
5, (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 16, 2009, effective May 1, 2009), 
LEXIS China Online, htttp://www.lexiscn.com (providing the latest conditions under which 
the investment would be subject to approval by Ministry of Commerce).  
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Finally, this Article will use logistic regressions to examine the 
relationship between internationalization and governance attributes.68  The 
dependent variables will be whether there was any outside director on the 
board and whether there was any foreign-educated top manager in 2013.  
The independent variables will be various internationalization indicators, 
including the accumulated number of acquisitions toward 2011, the 
accumulated number of joint ventures toward 2011, the accumulated 
number of overseas subsidiaries as of 2012, and whether the group has an 
overseas-listed firm.69  The control variables will include: logged revenues 
(2010) to control for firm size, ROA (2010) for efficiency,70 and whether 
the SOE has vice-ministerial rank.71  Groups that hold a higher status in the 
government system (i.e., vice-ministerial rank) would be more impervious 
to international pressure, as they are closer to the inner circle of China’s 
domestic political power. 
 
B. Results 
Table 5 shows the number of the central SOEs’ overseas 
acquisitions, joint ventures, and subsidiary establishments by country in the 
period of 2003-2011.  Hong Kong has been an important place for the 
central SOEs’ activity in overseas acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
subsidiaries.  However, Chinese SOEs’ investments in Hong Kong very 
often are simply “round-tripping” – where Chinese firms take money 
offshore, dress up in financial secrecy, then return back home to enjoy the 
tax benefits available only to foreigners.72  Moreover, the SOEs often use 
Hong Kong incorporated companies to engage in investment in other 
                                                 
68 Logistic regression is used to model dichotomous outcome variables.  The dependent 
variables (whether the SOE has at least one independent director and whether the 
management team includes any foreign educated executive) have binary outcomes (i.e., yes 
or no).  
69 The data years vary because the data collection process for the variables started and ended 
at different times.  The time difference would not significantly change the outcomes as the 
numbers of deals do not change significantly from year to year.  As to the variable of whether 
the group has an overseas listed firm, it is coded 1 if the SOE has an overseas listed firm; 0 
if without an overseas listed subsidiary. 
70 The 113 central SOEs are not publicly traded companies and therefore do not have an 
obligation to publish their financial performance or other information.  SASAC occasionally 
disclosed some of these SOEs’ individual financial data.  The latest release was the 2010 
data.  
71  Of the 113 central SOEs, fifty-three hold vice-ministerial ranks in the government 
administration system.  The top managers of these vice-ministerial level SOEs are directly 
appointed by the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party.  
72 Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J. 
INT’L BUS. STUD. 337, 340 (2008); Dylan Sutherland &  John Anderson, The Pitfalls of Using 
Foreign Direct Investment Data to Measure Chinese Multinational Enterprise Activity, 221 
CHINA Q. 21, 24-25 (Mar. 2015); Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s Round-Tripping 
FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Latin Am./Caribbean and Asia/Pac. Econ. and Bus. 
Ass’n, Working Paper No. 24, 2004).  
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countries, which makes Hong Kong more a portal than a destination of the 
SOEs’ foreign investment.73  Excluding Hong Kong, the top countries of 
the central SOEs’ acquisition activities are Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.  These countries (except 
Singapore) are liberal markets as per the varieties-of-capitalism literature,74 
politically mature democracies, and within the common law family.  In 
other words, the central SOEs’ acquisition activities take place significantly 
in countries whose institutional environments are very dissimilar from 
China, which features state ownership, authoritarian government, and the 
civil law system (considered a “bad” corporate law regime as per the “law 
and finance” literature).75  Australia, Canada, and the United States are also 
the countries that have regulations specifically addressing concerns about 
investment by foreign SOEs.  This high degree of institutional mismatch 
suggests Chinese SOEs could face great normative pressure on their 
governance structure when entering these markets. 
  
Table 5: Overseas Investment Deals of China’s National Champions, 2003-
2011
76 
 
Location of Acquisitons 
Number of Acquisition 
Deals (%) 
Location of Joint Ventures 
Number of JV Deals (%) 
Location of Subsidariy 
Establishements  
Number of Subsidairy 
Establishments (%) 
Hong Kong 
198 (35.5%) 
Australia 
26 (12.3%) 
Hong Kong 
360 (15.5%) 
Australia 
76 (13.6%) 
Hong Kong 
21 (10.0%) 
United States 
91 (3.6%) 
Canada 
47 (8.4%) 
United States 
21 (10.0%) 
United Arab Emirates 
64 (2.8%) 
United States 
27 (4.8%) 
Canada 
11 (5.2%) 
Australia 
62 (2.7%) 
Singapore 
20 (3.6%) 
Russia 
11 (5.2%) 
Singapore 
55 (2.4%) 
Brazil 
18 (3.2%) 
Saudi Arabia 
8 (3.8%) 
British Virgin Island 
54 (2.3%) 
United Kingdom 
16 (2.9%) 
Taiwan 
7 (3.3%) 
Saudi Arabia 
48 (2.1%) 
Nigeria 
8 (1.4%) 
Indonesia 
6 (2.8%) 
Russia 
45 (1.9%) 
Kazakhstan 
8 (1.4%) 
Japan 
5 (2.4%) 
Germany 
39 (1.7%) 
Chile India Indonesia 
                                                 
73 Morck et al., supra note 72, at 339-340. 
74  Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, VARIETIES of CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 19 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 
2001). 
75 Rafael La Porta et al., supra note 46, at 1113 (arguing that the common law system is 
better able to protect investors than the civil law system). 
76 Raw data on acquisitions and joint ventures are manually collected from the SDC Platinum 
M&A database; raw data on subsidiary establishments are manually collected from 
Directory of Overseas Investment Institutions published by Ministry of Commerce of China. 
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8 (1.4%) 5 (2.4%) 39 (1.7%) 
Indonesia 
8 (1.4%) 
South Korea 
5 (2.4%) 
Zambia 
38 (1.6%) 
Others 
124 (1.4%) 
Others 
85 (40.3%) 
Others 
1,431 (61.5%) 
Total 
558 (100%) 
Total 
211(100%) 
Total 
2,326 (100%) 
 
Chinese Aquisitor (by type) 
 
Chinese JV Partner (by 
type) 
 
Investing Entity 
Parent Company 
90 (16.1%) 
Parent Company 
77 (34.5%) 
Parent Company 
192 (8.3%) 
Subsidiary 
468 (83.9%) 
Subsidiary 
134 (63.5%) 
Subsidiary 
2,134 (91.7%) 
Total 
558(100%) 
Total 
211 (100%) 
Total 
2,326 (100%) 
 
Ownership Stake After 
Acquisition 
 
Equity Stake in JV 
 
<50 percent 
77 (13.8%) 
<50 percent 
36 (17.1%) 
 
>=50 percent 
190 (34.1%) 
>=50 percent 
93 (44.1%) 
 
Unknown 
291 (52.2%) 
Unknown 
82 (38.9%) 
 
Total 
558 (100%) 
Total 
211(100%) 
 
Average Stake 
68.9% (N=267) 
Average Stake 
48.9% (N=129) 
 
 
Table 5 also shows that, excluding missing data, a majority of the 
deals are acquisitions of absolute controlling stakes. The average 
acquisition of a controlling stake was 68.9%.  The popularity in acquiring 
controlling ownership suggests Chinese SOEs may be more interested in 
being an active controller than a passive observer in corporate management.  
Their control interest is often suspected especially when there is a great 
degree of institutional mismatch between China and the investment 
destinations.  
Table 5 further shows that 83.9% of the acquisitions are done 
through the downstream subsidiaries rather than the parent companies in the 
corporate groups (i.e. the holding companies directly under SASAC’s 
control).  As discussed in Section IV, the subsidiaries are embedded in the 
business group network controlled by the holding company and ultimately 
by the party-state.  This ownership structure can effectively shield the 
holding company and the party-state from disclosing their governance 
practices and even hide actual practices behind subsidiaries.  In such cases, 
the holding companies are not directly exposed to foreign normative 
pressure; therefore, governance influence, if at all, tends to be limited to the 
subsidiaries. 
In addition to direct acquisitions, joint ventures are another type of 
international equity connections.  Australia, the United States, and Canada 
again have the highest concentration of the foreign joint venture deals.  
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About 35% of the joint ventures are established through the parent 
companies, much higher than acquisition deals, where there are only about 
16% via the parent companies.  Because joint ventures are usually not 
subject to foreign investment regulatory reviews in the host country, parent 
companies themselves, even without using subsidiaries as a shield, can still 
maintain obscurity about their governance practices to foreigners.77 
Table 5 also shows the geographic distribution of subsidiary 
establishments.  Hong Kong again tops the list, as it has been used as a main 
portal to foreign investment.  Unlike mergers and joint ventures, subsidiary 
establishments are not obviously concentrated in a few advanced economies, 
but, rather, are widely dispered in a large number of countries.  No single 
country (except Hong Kong) exerts any significant influence.  Diverse 
investment locations may dilute institutional pressure from any particular 
country.  Moreover, most (91.7%) of them are established through 
subsidiaries rather than parent companies, which distance the parent SOEs 
from foreign institutional pressure. 
Table 6 further shows the correlation between various 
internationalization indicators and whether the central SOE has any outside 
director on its board.  The degree of internationalization, whether measured 
as the number of overseas acquisitions, the number of overseas joint 
ventures, or the number of overseas subsidiary establishments, has a very 
weak or virtually zero correlation with the existence of an outside director 
on the board.  Investments directly made by the parent companies 
themselves do not present any better chance of adopting an outside director.  
Furthermore, investments in Australia, Canada, and the United States also 
do not provide a meaningful positive correlation. In contrast, the high 
degree of institutional mismatch theoretically may generate regulatory or 
normative pressure to change governance. Internationalization is also 
virtually irrelevant to whether the SOE has any foreign-educated executives, 
as shown in Table 7.  
                                                 
77 As shown in Table 2, all the foreign investment regulations only regulate acquisition of an 
existing business rather than creation of a business entity such as a joint venture. 
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Table 6: Point-Biserial Coefficients between Internationalization and Outside 
Directors 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Correlations between 
Number of Acquisitions 
and Existence of Outside 
Directors 
        
All Deals .008 -.027 -.049 -.067 -.111 -.120 -.141 -.006 
Deals by Parent Company -.045 -.091 -.074 -.084 -.132 -.126 -.169 .046 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
.123 -.031 -.024 -.045 -.084 -.093 -.119 .009 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
.110 -.003 -.028 -.057 -.106 -.116 -.125 -.021 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) by Parent 
Company 
-.037 -.085 -.032 -.010 -.101 -.109 -.172 .073 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) by Parent 
Company 
-.038 -.085 -.032 -.019 -.109 -.119 -.182 .086 
Deals in Australia, Canada, 
USA by Parent Company 
-.023 -.067 -.079 -.086 -.128 -.123 -.173 .027 
Correlations between 
Number of Joint Ventures 
and Existence of Outside 
Directors 
        
All Deals .082 -.039 -.024 -.037 -.043 -.086 -.099 .051 
Deals by Parent Company .103 -.032 -.004 -.019 -.026 -.072 -.071 .052 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
-.065 -.023 -.052 -.058 -.024 -.080 -.041 .111 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
-.062 -.050 -.061 -.074 -.064 -.113 -.082 .046 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) by Parent 
Company 
-.022 -.053 -.058 -.001 .020 -.065 .059 .126 
Deals in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) by Parent 
Company 
-.022 -.065 -.069 -.014 .006 -.074 .048 .103 
Deals in Australia, Canada, 
USA by Parent Company 
---a -.040 -.041 056 .038 -.046 -.057 -.044 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Correlations between 
Number of Overseas 
Subsidiaries and Existence 
of Outside Directors 
        
All Establishments -.052 .015 .146 .013 .006 -.018 -.032 .008 
Establishments by Parent 
Company 
-.052 .058 .131 .121 .054 .121 .162 .168 
2015]                                             CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS                   111 
 
Establishments in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
-.067 .051 .084 .041 .049 .031 .058 .120 
Establishments in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
-.047 .101 .136 .105 .077 .046 .052 .165 
Establishments in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) by Parent 
Company 
-.046 .063 .037 .026 -.018 -.039 .047 .107 
Establishments in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) by Parent 
Company 
-.049 .056 .029 .014 -.038 -.032 .066 .161 
Establishments in Australia, 
Canada, USA by Parent 
Companies 
-.037 .022 .004 -.014 -.067 -.075 .107 .097 
Ｎ 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Deals are accumulated to the prior year. For example, in 2005, the correlation is between 
the number of deals accumulated toward 2004 (t-1) and whether the firm had an outside 
director in 2005 (t). Advanced economies include countries according to IMF Advanced 
Economies List (World Economic Outlook, October 2012, p. 180).  
Point-biserial correlation is a measure of the strength of a relationship between one 
continuous variable and one dichotomous variable. The correlation coefficient is between 1 
(perfect positive correlation) and -1 (perfect negative correlation). When the correlation 
coefficient is close to zero, it means virtually no correlation. It is generally considered a 
weak positive correlation if the coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.3; a weak negative 
correlation if between -0.1 and -0.3. 
a All the observations have zero deals; therefore, no value can be provided. 
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Table 7: Correlation between Internationalization and Foreign-Educated Top 
Managers 
 
 
 
Existence of  
Foreign-Educated  
Executives  (2013) 
Number of Foreign-
Educated Executives  
(2013) 
 (1) (2) 
Accumulated Number of Acquisitions (2011)   
All Deals .089 .139 
Deals by Parent Companies .145 .107 
 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
.071 .060 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
.098 .157 
Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Excluded) 
.194 .157 
Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Included) 
.205 .166 
Deals by Parent Company in Australia, Canada, 
USA 
.148 .149 
Accumulated Number of Joint Ventures (2011)   
All Deals .156 .173 
Deals by Parent Companies .191 .148 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Excluded) 
.093 .214 
Deals in Advanced Economies (Hong Kong 
Included) 
.109 .240 
Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Excluded) 
.194 .157 
Deals by Parent Company in Advanced Economies 
(Hong Kong Included) 
.161 .193 
Deals by Parent Companies in Australia, Canada, 
USA 
.071 .030 
Accumulated Number of Subsidiary 
Establishment (2012) 
  
All Establishments .039 -.028 
Establishments by Parent Companies .133 .185 
Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong 
Kong Excluded) 
.009 -.025 
Establishments in Advanced Economies (Hong 
Kong Included) 
.013 .004 
Establishments by Parent Company in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong Excluded) 
.063 .162 
Establishments by Parent Company in Advanced 
Economies (Hong Kong Included) 
.093 .182 
Establishments by Parent Companies in Australia, 
Canada, USA 
-.037 .042 
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Ｎ 113 113 
Column 1 reports point-biserial correlation coefficients that measure the relationship between a 
dichotomous variable and a quantitative variable. Column 2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients that 
measure the relationship between two quantitative variables. The correlation coefficients are always 
between 1 (perfect positive correlation) and -1 (perfect negative correlation). When the correlation 
coefficient is close to zero, it means virtually no correlation. It is generally considered a weak positive 
correlation if the coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.3; a weak negative correlation if between -0.1 and -0. 
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Figure 1 shows a simple linear regression on the time of an SOE’s 
overseas IPO (initial public offering) and the time of its establishment of 
outsider directors.78  It shows that earlier overseas listing is associated with 
later, rather than earlier, adoption of outsider directors.  In theory, a parent 
SOE that is exposed to international corporate governance through its 
overseas-listed subsidiary should adopt outsider directors earlier than a 
parent SOE who has not been exposed as long to international corporate 
governance.  However, the findings here cast doubt over the idea that 
international influence is a main driver of the central SOEs’ governance 
reform. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Time of Overseas Listing and Time of 
Institutionalizing Independent Directors 
 
 
Table 8 shows logistic regressions on internationalization 
indicators and governance attributes.  Models 1-8 show the relationship 
between internationalization and existence of any outside directors on the 
board.  Note that in Models 2, 4, 6, and 7, all of the odds ratios for 
international indicators are close to one, suggesting virtually no effect of 
internationalization on the existence of outsider directors.  The odds ratios 
for the number of acquisitions (.760, Model 3) and the number of joint 
ventures (.367, Model 5) made by parent companies in 
Australia/Canada/USA are less than one.  It means that parent SOEs that 
have more acquisitions and joint ventures in countries with high 
institutional mismatch are less likely to have outsider directors on the board. 
This finding is contrary to the theoretical prediction.  Having an overseas 
listing subsidiary increases the odds of having an outside director on the 
board in the parent SOE, but the effect is small (1.841, Model 8).   
                                                 
78 Some Chinese national champions have multiple overseas listed subsidiaries.  Figure 1 
uses the time of the earliest overseas IPO in the corporate group. 
y = -0.16x + 2,330.73
R² = 0.14
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Time of 
Institutionali
zing 
Independent 
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Models 9-16 show the relationship between internationalization 
and existence of any foreign educated executives.  Note that the odds ratios 
of the number of overseas acquisitions (.998, Model 10), joint ventures 
(1.063, Model 12), and overseas subsidiary establishments (.998, Model 14) 
are close to one, indicating virtually no relationship between these 
internationalization indicators and existence of any foreign educated 
executives in the parent SOE.  Both the number of acquisitions (1.391, 
Model 11) and the number of joint ventures (1.332, Model 13) made by 
parent companies in Australia, Canada, and the U.S. have positive effects 
on the existence of foreign educated managers, but the effects are small.  
Moreover, having an overseas-listed subsidiary significantly reduces the 
odds of having a foreign-educated executive in the parent SOE by 73.9% 
(=1-0.261).  The result is contrary to the expectation that overseas listing 
would indirectly expose the parent SOE to international corporate 
governance and thus increase the chances of including a foreign-educated 
professional in the top management team. 
116 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
 
 
2015]                                             CHINA'S NATIONAL CHAMPIONS                   117 
 
For control variables, SOEs with larger revenues are more likely to 
adopt outside directors but generally less likely to have foreign-educated 
executives.  More profitable firms (measured by ROA) are more likely to 
have outside directors and foreign-educated top managers.  The vice-
ministerial SOEs in the government system are less likely to have outsider 
directors on the board but more likely to have foreign educated executives.  
 
VI. Implications 
 
A. The Convergence-Persistence Debate 
A major debate in comparative corporate governance scholarship 
since the turn of the century has been focused on the future of national 
corporate governance systems in the era of globalization—will systems 
converge on a universal model (especially the Anglo-Saxon model) or will 
they continue to retain their national characteristics?   
The debate has reached a theoretical impasse between market-
imperative theories predicting global embracement of shareholder primacy 
and path-dependence theories predicting persistence of national institutions 
that protect domestic vested interest. 79  China, despite its enormous 
economy, is glaringly absent in the debate, particularly in the works that set 
the fundamental framework of analysis.  The persuasive power of these 
competing theories would be limited without China. 
According to the convergence school, capital market integration 
through cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as overseas listing is 
a strong driver of governance convergence.80  International mergers and 
acquisitions connect firms of different governance systems and often 
require changes in the governance structure of acquiring or acquired firms, 
or both.  Overseas listing connects the listing firm to foreign investors and 
requires the firm to adopt governance rules set by the foreign stock 
exchange and relevant regulators, making the governance structure of the 
listing firm converge on the model of the listing jurisdiction.81   Unlike the 
convergence school, the persistence theories suggest limited convergence 
for SOEs embedded in China’s idiosyncratic state capitalism.  
Recent SOE reforms in China, such as launching the board of 
directors and institutionalizing independent directors, indicate at least some 
                                                 
79 For the major pieces in the debate, see generally CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6-14 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark. J. Roe eds., 2004) (discussing 
forces inducing convergence and forces inducing persistence in corporate governance 
systems). 
80 Toru Yoshikawa & Abdul A. Rasheed, Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical 
Review and Future Directions, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 388, 390 (2009). 
81 Coffee, supra note 53, at 1799-1800. 
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“formal convergence” 82  or “de jure convergence” 83   toward the Anglo-
Saxon model.  Ostensibly, the adoption of Anglo-Saxon practices appears 
to be encouraging evidence to convergence theories.  However, preliminary 
empirical findings in this Article raise questions about whether 
internationalization is an apt explanation for Chinese SOEs’ governance 
change, particularly for those deeply embedded in the political and 
economic network controlled by the state owner.  Why do Chinese national 
champions’ international investment activities have little bearing on their 
governance reform pace?  If it is not internationalization, what is the main 
driving force for their governance reform?  This Article offers some 
possible explanations for the weak relationship between international equity 
connections and the central SOEs’ governance change.  
First, the idea that international equity connections either through 
FDI or overseas listing can push for governance change of the parent SOEs 
assumes that there is some diffusion of governance practices flowing from 
the host country back to the headquarters in the home country.  However, 
the diffusion influence may be diluted through layers of ownership that 
shield the parent SOE from international pressure to reform.  As shown 
previously in Table 5, a majority of the investment deals are done through 
subsidiaries rather than the holding companies themselves.  Available 
information suggests there is often limited communication between the 
overseas subsidiaries and their parent companies headquartered in 
Beijing. 84   This investment structure and limited communication may 
weaken the potential governance influence.  Moreover, while the top 
investment destinations are advanced economies with regulatory processes 
scrutinizing investments by foreign SOEs, they only account for a minority 
of the transactions.  As of the 558 acquisitions, only 150 of the deals are 
                                                 
82 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L., 329, 332 (Spring 2001). 
83 See Tarun Khanna et al., Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A 
Cross-Country Analysis, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 69, 71 (2006) (defining de jure 
convergence as the adoption of similar corporate governance laws across countries and de 
facto convergence as similarities in actual practices); id. at 76-81 (finding empirically strong 
evidence of de jure convergence, though not on the U.S. style, and no evidence of de facto 
convergence). 
84 Interview with a manager of central SOE’s listed subsidiary who managed legal issues of 
the company’s overseas acquisitions (May 21, 2011); interview with an executive of central 
SOE’s overseas subsidiary in North America (Dec. 10, 2013).  News reports also often report 
that the parent SOEs have little tracking ability over their overseas subsidiaries’ activities.  
See, e.g., Bingning Wang, Zhongshiyou Fanfu Yanshen Zhi Haiwai Yewu Lvgongxun 
Jieguan Zhuoshou Chongzheng (中石油反腐延伸至海外฀฀ ฀功฀接管着手重整) 
[CNPC Anti-Corruption Extends to Overseas Business, Gongxun Lv Takes on the Task to 
Reform], CHINA TIMES, May 24, 2014; Bang An, Yangqi Haiwai Zichan Jianguan Queshi 
Youxiao Zhidu (央企海外฀฀฀管缺失有效制度) [The Lack of Effective Supervision over 
Central SOEs’ Overseas Assets], CAIJING (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://comments.caijing.com.cn/20150320/3844611.shtml (stating the lack of 
communication between the foreign subsidiaries and the parent company). 
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invested in Australia, Canada and United States; and of the 150, only 
twenty-six are by holding companies themselves.  As a result, China’s 
national champions may have insufficient direct exposure to environments 
of high institutional mismatch.   
Second, it entails an inquiry into Chinese SOEs’ globalization 
motivation.  The Chinese government formally ushered in the “going global” 
policy in 2000.  According to the official statements, the “going global” 
policy is aimed at participating in international technology cooperation and 
competition, take full advantages of international and domestic markets, 
encourage external processing trade, resources exploration as well as 
international construction contracting and develop a collection of 
multinational companies and well-known brands.85  Corporate governance 
improvement seems not a primary consideration from Chinese 
policymakers’ perspective.  Consistent with the government’s policy, 
existing empirical studies focus on non-corporate governance factors and 
confirm that market size expansion and natural resources acquisitions are 
important motives for Chinese SOEs’ outward direct investments.86   
Also, individual firms may not be motivated to improve corporate 
governance through FDI.  As we have seen, Hong Kong accounts for a large 
portion of the foreign investment deals. It is believed that most of Hong 
Kong transactions are through shell companies for “round-tripping” rather 
than real investments.87  Therefore, this form of foreign investment does not 
really expose the investing SOEs to any institutional pressure in the host 
country, let alone generating any positive flow-back effect to their 
headquarters.  As the Chinese government recently has completely phased 
out all preferential treatments for foreign enterprises,88 it is to be observed 
how this policy change will reshape the SOEs’ foreign investment 
motivation and destination choices.     
                                                 
85 Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Dishige Wunian Jihua Gangyao (国民฀฀和社会฀展
第十个五年฀划฀要) [Guidelines on National Economic and Social Development of the 
10th Five Year Plan] (promulgated by the 4th Meeting of the National Congress, Mar. 15, 
2001), http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.  
86  See Peter J. Buckley et al., The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 499, 499 (2007) (arguing that natural resource seeking is 
one of the main reasons for China’s FDI); Luke Hurst, Comparative Analysis of the 
Determinants of China's State-Owned Outward Direct Investment in OECD and Non-OECD 
Countries, 19 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 74, 74 (2011) (arguing that market size expansion and 
natural resources are reasons for China’s outward direct investment); Ivar Kolstad & Arne 
Wiig, What Determines Chinese Outward FDI?, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 26, 26 (2012) (arguing 
that China’s outward FDI focuses on large markets with abundant natural resources). 
87 Xiao, supra note 72. 
88 In the past, China gave a variety of favorable treatments for foreign investors, but this 
preference policy began to change in 2006.  In 2007, China enhanced its supervision over 
foreign investments involving national security sectors. In 2008, the unified Corporate 
Income Tax Act, which treats domestic and foreign corporations alike.  As of Dec. 1, 2010, 
China terminated the last two tax preferences (urban maintenance and construction tax and 
education surcharge) for foreign investors. 
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While Chinese policymakers might not intend governance 
improvement through international trade or outward direct investment, they 
indeed took overseas listing as an important internationalization strategy to 
improve SOE governance. 89   Scholars have shown that overseas listed 
SOEs have lower earnings management, more professional directors on the 
board, higher investment efficiency and greater firm valuation than their 
domestically listed counterparts. 90   However, preliminary empirical 
evidence in this Article indicates that the positive effects are limited to the 
listed subsidiaries and not effectively reflected in their parent companies.  
The lack of positive diffusion to the parent companies may be related to the 
typical way of how Chinese SOEs crafted their overseas listings.  The 
conventional strategy has been to carve out the crown jewel assets of the 
group and bundle them into the listed firm while leaving bad assets and 
other problems in the unlisted part of the corporate group, usually the 
holding company. 91   This assets segregation strategy may practically 
concentrate complex corporate problems in the holding company and thus 
make the governance reform of the holding company more challenging and 
insensitive to international influence. 
Finally, the behavior of China’s SOEs is determined not only by 
market forces but probably more by the government’s decisions.  It is often 
the Chinese government rather than the market that selects which firms to 
engage in reform.  The Chinese government determined which firms could 
list shares publicly and abroad.92  SASAC selected in batches which SOEs 
were eligible to experiment with the board of directors, independent 
directors and other reform measures.93  SASAC together with the Party’s 
Organization Department consider factors (e.g. political loyalty) other than 
market demand when appointing top managers.94  While there is no direct 
                                                 
89 Niuyue Shangshi Yangqi Yida 68 Jia, Jixu Guli Yangqi Haiwai Shangshi (฀฀上市央企
已达 68家，฀฀鼓励央企海外上市) [Already 68 NYSE Listed Central SOEs, Continue 
Encouraging More], SECURITIES DAILY, Aug. 24, 2008 (reporting then-SASAC chairman’s 
statements in a press conference regarding the purposes of overseas listing).  
90 See Mingyi Hung et al., supra note 56, at 22-26 (showing that overseas listed SOEs tend 
have lower profitability and more professional boards than the domestically listed SOEs). . 
91 CARL WALTER & FRASER HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: INSIDE CHINA’S STOCK MARKETS 
99 (2003).  
92  The initial public offering (IPO) system in China is approval-based system. But the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission is considering a registration-based system in 
replace of the approval-based system.  
93  For instance, in 2004, seven SOEs were selected in the first batch to institute a board of 
directors; afterwards, many SOEs in several batches were included to participate in the 
reform. A recent example is in July 2014, SASAC selected six SOEs to experiment with 
“four major reforms” (i.e. creation of a state-owned assets operation company, 
implementation of mixed ownership, marketization of the top management team, and 
establishment of anti-corruption inspection committees).  
94 See Lin, supra note 64 at 789-791 (noting that an investigation of Chinese SOE executive 
backgrounds show that factors such as political loyalty play a role in determining SOE 
leadership).   
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evidence showing how Chinese policymakers prioritize SOEs on the reform 
agenda, it seems that the degree of internationalization is an unimportant 
factor in determining who gets reformed first.  The reform pace is more 
determined by complex domestic forces than by international market or 
regulatory pressure.   
 Over the past decade, China’s national champions have made some 
headway toward international standard practices (such as adopting the 
board of directors and independent directors), but their reform pace appears 
largely unrelated to their activity in international investment or exposure to 
global capital markets.  Their (at least) formal governance change lends 
some support to convergence, but the impetus for change seems to have 
little to do with their degree of integration with international markets.  
Neither the convergence nor persistence side alone offers a full explanation. 
 
B. China’s SOE Reform Forward 
With the political transition in 2012, China’s SOEs have entered a 
new round of reform. The reform agenda appears ambitious and 
comprehensive, ranging from ownership to various corporate governance 
issues.  Among other changes, “going global” remains a key strategic policy 
for corporate growth.95  The recently unveiled “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
policy, which seeks to establish new trade and transport links between 
China, Central Asia, and Europe, involves a tremendous amount of overseas 
infrastructure investment typically undertaken by the SOEs under 
SASAC.96  Thus, the Chinese national champions are likely to continue 
their important roles in China’s global expansion.   
Chinese SOEs often perceive foreign investment reviews in host 
countries as unfriendly or discriminative.97  This perception partly induces 
Chinese SOEs to use subsidiaries to engage in their overseas expansion in 
order to avoid opposition in the host country.98  But the use of subsidiaries, 
sometimes chains of subsidiaries, may exacerbate the agency problem in 
                                                 
95 Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Di Shier Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (国民经济和社
会发展第十二个五年规划纲要 ) [Guidelines on National Economic and Social 
Development of the 12th Five-Year Plan] pt. 52 (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://ghs.ndrc.gov.cn/ghwb/gjwngh/201109/P020110919590835399263.pdf.  
96 See Dingding Chen, China's 'Marshall Plan' Is Much More, DIPLOMAT, Nov. 10, 2014 
(explaining the meaning behind China’s “one belt, one road” plan); Jeremy Page, China Sees 
Itself at Center of New Asian Order, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2014 (explaining China’s plan on 
“Silk Road Economic Belt”). 
97  See, e.g., Chester Dawson and Elena Cherney, China Diplomat Assails Canada’s 
Restrictions on Foreign State Enterprises, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-oil-patch-diplomat-assails-canadas-investment-
restrictions-on-foreign-state-owned-enterprises-1412948502 (discussing China’s top 
diplomat’s criticism towards Chinese SOEs’ being unfairly treated in Canada). 
98 To be sure, besides political concerns, there are some economic reasons such as tax 
benefits to invest through subsidiaries.  
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SOEs. Globalizing SOEs have a “triple” agency problem. 99   The first 
agency relationship exists in which the citizens of the country as nominal 
shareholders (principals) task politicians (agents) to monitor the SOE’s 
behavior and performance.  Politicians may use SOEs to serve their own 
interests rather than pursing the objectives mandated by the citizens. But 
citizens have limited control over politicians, especially in a political regime 
where democratic elections are prohibited. The second agency relationship 
exists where politicians delegate managers to manage the SOE.  The 
managers may have objectives diverging from the objectives of citizens and 
politicians.  If the SOE is globalized through subsidiaries, a third agency 
relationship exists between the headquarters and the subsidiaries.  Overseas 
subsidiaries may escape their principals’ monitoring; as the Chinese 
proverb says “Heaven is high and the emperor is far away.”  It has been 
reported that SASAC and the parent SOEs headquartered in Beijing have 
little tracking over foreign subsidiaries’ activities and there is ample room 
for overseas managers to engage in corruption.100  It is hard to expect that 
the “going out” policy would generate any positive flow-back effects to the 
parent SOEs if they have little knowledge about what is going on in their 
subsidiaries.  
 In very recent years, SASAC has introduced many regulations in an 
attempt to intensify monitoring over SOE overseas subsidiaries. 101   In 
March 2015, SASAC further announced that it will purchase third party 
                                                 
99  Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational 
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 919, 931 (2014). 
100 See, e.g., Bingning Wang supra note 83; Meiti Cheng Yangqi Haiwai Yewu Cun Fubai, 
Guoyou Zichan Liushi Hen Pubian (媒体称央企海外฀฀存腐฀ 国有฀฀流失很普遍) 
[Media Reports Corruption in Central SOEs’ Overseas Business, Squandering State-Owned 
Assets is Common], PEOPLE DAILY, May 26, 2014, 
http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0526/c1002-25066234.html (discussing the corruption 
in China’s overseas business which has caused squandering of state-owned assets).   
101 In response to an outbreak of SOE overseas investment scandals, SASAC promulgated 
Provisional Measures on Supervising Central Enterprises’ Overseas Assets (2011) and 
Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Property Rights (2011) and 
Provisional Measures Managing Central Enterprises’ Overseas Investment (2012).  As of 
2011, 27.3% of the about 2000 overseas subsidiaries of the central SOEs were running at a 
loss and 72.7% were making profits or breaking even, according to the Department Head 
(Mr. Ziming Shi) of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce 
Press Conference.  Press Release, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 
Shangwubu Guojiatongjiju Guojiawaihuiguanliju Gongtong Juban "Duiwai Zhijie Touzi 
Tongji Zhidu Sheli Shi Zhounian Ji 2011 Niandu Zhongguo Dui wai Zhijie Touzi Tongji 
Gongbao Xinwen Fabuhui" (商฀部 国家฀฀局 国家外฀管理局共同฀฀“฀外直接投
฀฀฀制度฀立十周年฀《2011 年度中国฀外直接投฀฀฀公฀》新฀฀布会) 
[PRC Ministry of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly held "The Tenth Anniversary of Setting up 
Statistical Measures for the Direct Outward Investment & Press Conference on Public Report 
on Chinese Direct Outward Investment Statistics for the year 2011”], (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/slfw/201208/20120808315863.shtml. 
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services from accounting firms through a bidding process to audit SOEs’ 
overseas assets.102  Enhancing supervision over SOEs’ overseas activities 
has also become part of the government’s anti-corruption campaign.  But 
the monitoring effectiveness so far seems limited as SASAC’s resources are 
unable to handle the scale and complexity of the SOE overseas assets.103  
Ironically, foreign investment reviews in host countries perhaps may 
alleviate the agency problem to some extent by acting as an additional 
mechanism to track SOE overseas operations and safeguard state-owned 
assets from being squandered.  Rather than simply viewing foreign 
investment reviews as hostile, SASAC may take foreign regulatory reviews 
as an opportunity to identify possible problems associated with SOEs’ 
foreign operations.   
 
C. Foreign Investment Regulations and Beyond 
Foreign investment reviews can easily get politicized as the key 
concepts (e.g. national interests and national security) in the regulations are 
so loosely defined that they allow domestic interest parties to escalate a 
business decision to a political controversy.  The poor transparency of 
Chinese SOEs further creates a convenient setting to play a politicization 
drama.  In the face of potential political challenges in the host country, 
Chinese SOEs may use several strategies to avoid hostile encounters.  For 
instance, they may use chains of subsidiaries or even individual managers 
as investment entities to hide their sensitive identities.  These strategies 
unfortunately make the governance of Chinese SOEs more obscure to 
outsiders and increase agency and corruption problems.  The host country 
may lose economic benefits if the investment is killed in the politicalized 
debate.  At worst, it creates a vicious circle.  To turn the vicious circle into 
a virtuous one, Chinese SOEs should make efforts to improve their 
governance quality.  But it is also important for the host country to keep its 
regulatory review decisions based on rational deliberation of facts rather 
than driven by irrational fear.104  
Since the key concern of foreign SOE investment is that the foreign 
government may interfere with the SOE management and extend its 
                                                 
102 Guoyou Zhongdian Daxing Qiye Jianshihui 2015 Niandu Jizhong Zhongdian Jiancha 
Xiangmu He Jingwai Guoyou ZichanJiancha Xiangmu Fuwu Caigou Zhaobiao Gonggao (国
有重点大型企฀฀事会 2015年度集中重点฀฀฀目和境外国有฀฀฀฀฀目服฀采
฀招฀公告) [Procurement and Tenders Notice for 2015 State-Owned Key Enterprise 
Supervision Board’s Focused Inspection Items and Overseas State-Owned Assets Inspection 
Services ] (promulgated by SASAC, Mar. 17, 2015) 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85881/n85901/c1809041/content.html. 
103 See Bingning Wang, supra note 83 (discussing the need for anti-corruption measures); 
Bang An, supra note 83 (discussing the need for better monitoring of the SOEs). 
104 See generally Zhang, supra note 25 (arguing that current foreign investment reviews 
regarding Chinese SOE investments are often dominated by fear rather than based on rational 
analysis). 
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tentacles to the invested entity in the host country, regulators in the host 
country typically want to make sure the investing SOE can make 
commitments to good corporate governance, which often means the 
invested subsidiary should operate independently of its parent SOE.  The 
independence demand may limit positive influence diffused from the 
subsidiary to the parent SOE.  Nevertheless, given that positive flow-back 
influence is likely elusive due to politics in the SOEs’ home country and 
many other factors such as managerial incentives, the independence or 
isolation policy is consistent with the host country’s interest, at least from a 
short-term perspective.   
Public controversies about Chinese SOEs’ international 
investments often have been concentrated in the foreign investment review 
process which acts a first-line safeguard against threats to the host country’s 
national interests.  But we should note that a vast majority of foreign 
investments either pass regulatory screening or proceed without triggering 
any regulatory scrutiny.105  Therefore, the practical issue for most foreign 
investments is about how foreign investors after entry in the host country 
operate their business entities, including economic, social, and 
environmental performance.   This continuous exposure to foreign 
institutional pressure is another potentially important source for governance 
change.  Thus, the question is how effectively the host country monitors 
foreign investors’ on-going performance.  For instance, it is often believed 
that many Chinese SOEs use their overseas subsidiaries to engage in corrupt 
activities.106  If a Chinese SOE uses its U.S. subsidiaries to bribe “foreign 
officials” (including Chinese officials), it may incur liability under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) where the Department of Justice and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may jointly or separately 
initiate an FCPA investigation.107  And if the Chinese SOE’s shares are 
registered in the United States, it is subject to numerous continuous 
disclosure obligations under securities regulations.  The SEC used to have 
a virtually blank record of enforcement against foreign issuers, but there 
seems a recent change in the enforcement passivity.108  This sort of ongoing 
                                                 
105 Australian, Canadian, and U.S. regulators periodically publish the number of approved 
and rejected applications. FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2013-
2014 (2015), http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications.asp; INDUSTRY CANADA, 
INVESTMENT CANADA ACT: QUARTERLY STATISTICS, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-
lic.nsf/eng/h_lk00015.html; COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR CY 2013 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx.  
106  See, e.g., Bingning Wang, supra note 83 (discussing the need for anti-corruption 
measures).  
107  See ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2006), 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1287_1.pdf (providing an overview of the 
FCPA).  
108 See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By Renting U.S. 
Securities Laws? 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 335 (2005) (finding very little enforcement against 
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oversight may play a more important role in protecting host countries’ 
interests and influencing foreign SOEs’ economic, social, and 
environmental practices than the entry screening of foreign investment 
reviews.  Host countries should not be so obsessed with one-shot foreign 
investment reviews while being oblivious to a raft of available regulatory 
tools that can protect their own interests on a continuing basis.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This Article has tried to investigate whether internationalization 
explains Chinese national champions’ governance reform patterns.  
Preliminary empirical findings in this Article suggest that Chinese SOEs’ 
international investment activity appears virtually irrelevant to their 
governance reform pace.  It casts a shadow over the optimistic view that 
international exposure would be an effective driving force to change the 
SOEs’ governance practices.  A complex combination of domestic politics, 
investment motives, investment structure, and locations restrict the direct 
linkage between internationalization and governance change.  This Article 
provides a better understanding of the complexity of governance change in 
the age of globalization.  It provides an innovative view for Chinese 
regulators with regard to the value of foreign investment reviews in a host 
country.  It calls for a depoliticized decision-making process in foreign 
investment regulatory regimes to create a virtuous circle for both investing 
SOEs and host economies.   
This early effort to understand the governance implications of 
Chinese SOEs’ globalization raises important questions for future research.  
Fundamentally, is globalizing Chinese SOEs desirable?  The global 
expansion of Chinese SOEs may have an effect of reversing China’s 
privatization efforts over the past three decades.  If internationalization 
plays a limited role in the national champions’ governance reform pace, 
what should be expected out of their global expansion?  Are the globally 
growing SOEs crowding out private enterprises in the Chinese economy 
and beyond?  It should be noted that the recent phenomenon of globalizing 
SOEs is not limited to China but many other economies such as Norway 
and Malaysia where state capital plays an important role in allocating 
resources. 109   Given that SOEs are closely connected with their home 
countries’ economic and political institutions, an immediate question that 
comes to mind is whether all SOEs are the same.  Existing literature 
                                                 
foreign issuers). But see Roger Nelson Silvers, SEC Enforcement of Foreign Firms: Is 
Bonding Really a Myth? (Univ. of Mass., Working Paper, Feb. 2012) (noting an increase of 
SEC enforcement against foreign issuers). 
109 See Cuervo-Cazurra et al., supra note 86, at 919 (discussing the rise of state-owned 
enterprises in international business). 
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provides sparse analysis on comparative SOE governance.110  There may be 
a variety of SOEs across countries.  Even within national borders, diversity 
may exist.  For instance, while preliminary evidence in this Article suggests 
that the governance change of China’s central SOEs has been largely 
unrelated to their degree of internationalization.  It is uncertain whether the 
empirical findings are equally applicable to provincial or local SOEs in 
China.  It has been proposed that local SOEs are subject to less government 
prerogatives and are more market-oriented.111  It requires future empirical 
research to confirm this proposition.  If it is true, then regulators should be 
sensitive to the diversity of SOEs, rather them treating them all alike.
                                                 
110  There are only a few studies on comparing state capitalism and SOEs.  See Aldo 
Musacchio & Sérgio G Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and 
Their Implications for Economic Performance, (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper, No. 12-
108, June 2012) (discussing the relationship between different state capitalism and SOEs); 
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2917, 2917 (2012) (examining how government ownership in the United States, Brazil, 
China, and Europe may make corporate law design less desirable for private companies). 
111 See Ming Hua Li et al., Varieties in State Capitalism: Outward FDI Strategies of Central 
and Local State-Owned Enterprises from Emerging Economy Countries, 45 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 980, 980 (2014) (discussing how local SOEs are subject to less governmental pressure 
and display greater market orientation). 
